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LAWYERS, JUDGES, AND UNWRITTEN RULES 
Bruce A. Markell* 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor Douglas Baird’s The Fraudulent Conveyance Origins of Chapter 
11: An Essay on the Unwritten Law of Corporate Reorganizations1 boldly 
reconceptualizes the role of the bankruptcy judge in corporate reorganizations. 
He sees the judge not as a neutral arbiter of dispute brought before her, but as a 
“referee” whose “job . . . is to police . . . negotiations [over the sensible capital 
structure of a firm in reorganization] and make sure that they are done according 
to Hoyle.”2 But unlike Hoyle, the rules to be enforced are not all written. Time 
and tradition have produced unwritten rules with respect to the conduct of a 
reorganization. Professor Baird’s article is a start at identifying and 
contextualizing these rules. 
I agree that unwritten rules exist. I differ with Professor Baird as to their 
provenance and their enforcement. 
As with all things, what is seen depends on perspective, and my perspective 
is different than Professor Baird’s. A famous exchange with the philosopher 
Ludwig Wittgenstein illustrates this point, as recounted by his former student 
and later his literary executor, Professor Elizabeth Anscombe: 
[Wittgenstein] once greeted me with the question: ‘Why do people say 
that it was natural to think that the sun went round the earth rather than 
that the earth turned on its axis?’ I replied: ‘I suppose, because it 
looked as if the sun went round the earth.’ ‘Well,’ he asked, ‘what 
would it have looked like if it had looked as if the earth turned on its 
axis?’3 
After working it out, the conclusion is both perspectives can explain the sun’s 
motion; identical conclusions often lie at end of disparate assumptions. Against 
this background, although I agree with much of Professor Baird’s conclusions, 
we differ on what has shaped both the current set of unwritten rules and the role 
of the judge in their application.  
 
 * Professor of Bankruptcy Law and Practice, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. 
 1 Douglas Baird, The Fraudulent Conveyance Origins of Chapter 11: An Essay on the Unwritten Law of 
Corporate Reorganizations, 36 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 699 (2020). 
 2 Id. at 717. 
 3 G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, AN INTRODUCTION TO WITTGENSTEIN’S TRACTATUS 151 (2nd ed. 1959) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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In this short response, I want to first sketch out my understanding of the role 
of fraud in avoiding transactions, an understanding that includes examination of 
the statute of 13 Eliz., but starts much earlier. My view of this history has a 
different take than Professor Baird; I see more the hand of adroit lawyers 
maneuvering judges to a desired result, and less of an understanding between 
bench and bar as to the rules of reorganization. I then want to assess Professor 
Baird’s perception of the role of the bankruptcy judge in corporate 
reorganizations. His metaphor is enforcement according to Hoyle; I offer a 
counternarrative based on the Marquess of Queensbury’s rules for boxing. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LAW 
Professor Baird spends much time carefully tracing a plausible development 
of courts’ reactions to what we now call fraudulent transfers. His analysis starts 
with the Statute of 13 Eliz., c. 5,4 a 1571 statute that I agree is a watershed 
development in fraudulent transfer law, especially as framed and applied by 
Edward Coke in his report of Twyne’s Case.5 The operative words of that 
statute—condemning transfers made with the actual intent to “hinder, delay or 
defraud”—still appear in statutes today.6 
But long before the reign of Elizabeth I, Roman law had recognized as a 
nominate tort an action fraus creditiorum similar in purpose and effect to the 
Statute of Elizabeth.7 And early English law acknowledged this. As Professor 
Glenn noted, “[t]he very terms, ‘in fraud of creditors,’ and ‘with intent to 
defraud’ them, as appearing in Roman law, found their way, with monotonous 
regularity, into English statutes long before the Act of Elizabeth was drafted.”8 
Twyne’s Case is thus an important waystation in the development of fraudulent 
transfer law, not the origin. 
 
 4 Statute of Elizabeth, 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571), repealed by The Law of Property Act, 15 Geo. 5, ch. 20, 
§ 172 (1925). 
 5 Twyne’s Case, 3 Coke 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Ch. 1601). For a thorough and entertaining 
examination of what really happened in Twyne’s Case; see Emily Kadens, A New Light on Twyne’s Case, 94 
AM. BANKR. L.J. (forthcoming 2020). 
 6 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2019); UNIF. VOIDABLE TRANSACTIONS ACT § 4(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW. 
COMM’N 2014). 
 7 See 1 GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 60 at 348 (rev. ed. 1940); 
Max Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances in California and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 27 CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 12, n.12 (1938); Max Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances at Roman Law, 18 VA. L. REV. 109, 111 (1931). 
 8 GLENN, supra note 7, at 83 (footnote omitted); see also Frank R. Kennedy, Involuntary Fraudulent 
Transfers, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 536 (1987) (“English legislation directed at such transfers [that] had been 
enacted by Parliament during the preceding two centuries.”); Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances in California, 
supra note 7, at 1–2 (noting that the 1571 Statute of 13 Elizabeth “reenacted many of the provisions and repeated 
many of the words of statutes of Henry VIII and Edward III . . . .”). 
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Even the concept of “badges of fraud” was not original to Twyne’s Case. As 
Professor Constantin Willems noted in his recent article, Coke, Collusion, and 
Conveyances: Unearthing the Roots of Twyne’s Case,9 another report of 
Twyne’s Case10 indicates that, in discussing badges of fraud, there was a prior 
“external influence,” as evidenced by the judges’ statement that Twyne’s Case 
had all the badges of fraud, “as Linwodde notes.”11 As Professor Willems points 
out,12 this refers to William Lyndwood (1375–1446), an English canonist who 
was most renowned as the author of the famous Provinciale seu Constitutiones 
Angliae.13 After studying Lyndwood’s work and the various reports of Twyne’s 
case, Professor Willems states that: 
We can therefore conclude that Coke’s reasoning [and uses of badges 
of fraud] coincides largely with what ‘Linwoode notes’: there are also 
six presumptions, of which three are identical, two are similar, and one 
which arguably may be reduced to the same general rule.14 
The status of Twyne’s Case as the origin of fraudulent conveyance law was also 
questioned over a century and a half later by none other than Lord Mansfield. In 
1776, he had a case before him that today we might call a case of a spendthrift 
trust.15 A lord had entered into a marriage settlement with his betrothed. The 
settlement was worth some £10,000 of property, but this property was 
transferred to a trust for lord and his new wife to possess and use. Under the 
terms of the trust, upon the lord’s death, any residue of the trust res was to pass 
to his new spouse and her heirs.  
A pre-marriage creditor of the lord saw the lord’s possession and use of 
property without title as a fraud. He levied upon the trust property under the 
Statute of 13 Elizabeth, and the trustees filed suit to reclaim the property. 
Lord Mansfield ruled for the lord and against the creditor.16 He began his 
judgment, however, with a strong statement regarding the relationship between 
the statute and the common law. 
 
 9 Constantin Willems, Coke, Collusion, and Conveyances: Unearthing the Roots of Twyne’s Case 36 J. 
LEG. HIST. 129, 136 (2015). 
 10 There are actually two other reports of the case in addition to Coke’s. Id. at 132. 
 11 Twyne’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Ch. 1601); Willems, supra note 9, at 137. 
 12 Willems, supra note 9, at 137. 
 13 William Lyndwood, Provinciale seu Constitutiones Angliae (Oxford, 1679). 
 14 Willems, supra note 9, at 137. 
 15 Cadogan v. Kennett, 2 Cowp. 433, 98 Eng. Rep. 1171 (K.B. 1776). 
 16 Apparently, the wife-to-be was a ward of Chancery, and a Chancery master had approved the settlement 
long before the creditor sought to enforce his writ. In addition, Lord Mansfield found that “there was clearly no 
intention to defraud, and there is a good consideration. Therefore, I am of opinion it could not be left to the jury 
to find the settlement fraudulent, merely because there were creditors.” Cadogan v. Kennett, 2 Cowp. 433, 
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The principles and rules of the common law, as now universally known 
and understood, are so strong against fraud in every shape, that the 
common law would have attained every end proposed by the statutes 
13 El. c. 5, and 27 El. c. 4. The former of these statutes relates to 
creditors only; the latter to purchasers. These statutes cannot receive 
too liberal a construction, or be too much extended in suppression of 
fraud.17 
Whether Lord Mansfield was correct about how the common law might have 
evolved without the Statute of 13 Elizabeth is beside the point. The point is that 
principles and norms underlying fraudulent transfer law are ancient, enduring, 
and malleable.18 Actions which harm one while enriching another, done without 
justification, have raised hackles throughout history. And when hackles are 
raised, lawyers arrive.  
Lawyers were already present documenting compositions and settlements 
for distressed debtors long before reorganization law emerged in the late 
Nineteenth Century. My sense is that such practices and devices proved 
inadequate to address the advent of limited liability and the larger enterprises 
limited liability facilitated—such as railroads. In a sense, lawyers were called 
upon to respond to the significant externalities such large firm failures imposed 
on society, such as loss of jobs and misuse of resources. 
Lawyers and finance professionals then looked for legal tools to address this 
old problem of divvying up the assets of a failed enterprise, which railroads, 
among others, presented in virulent form. Professor Baird sketches his 
interpretation of how lawyers found and used fraudulent conveyance law to 
address these issues. I cannot quibble too much with his exposition, but I think 
the orientation is skewed. The professionals involved could not make existing 
 
43637, 98 Eng. Rep. 1171, 1174 (K.B. 1776). 
 17 Cadogan v. Kennett, 2 Cowp. 433, 434, 98 Eng. Rep. 1171, 1172 (K.B. 1776). Lord Mansfield also 
indicated that a valid consideration would not immunize a transaction from attack under the statute. As he stated: 
I have known several cases where persons have given a fair and full price for goods, and where 
the possession was actually changed; yet being done for the purpose of defeating creditors, the 
transaction has been held fraudulent, and therefore void.  
Id. 
 18 That the simple injunction against transfers made with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud could 
spawn much litigation is shown by the fact that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, there were no fewer 
than five complete treatises devoted almost exclusively to the subject of fraudulent transfers. See, e.g., HENRY 
W. MAY, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT AND VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES (W. Douglas Edwards, ed., 3d Am. ed. 
1908); FREDERICK S. WAIT, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND CREDITORS’ BILLS (1884); MELVILLE M. 
BIGELOW, THE LAW OF FRAUD (1877); ORLANDO F. BUMP, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1872); WILLIAM 
ROBERTS, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTES RELATING TO VOLUNTARY AND FRAUDULENT 
CONVEYANCES (3d Am. ed. 1845). 
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devices work; the quantity and dispersion of stakeholders was too challenging. 
So lawyers did what lawyers often do: they suggested new uses for existing law; 
that is, they saw fraudulent conveyance law as a possible framework for creditor 
recoveries. That such laws came to be the intellectual foundation of 
reorganization law is likely more a testament to the cleverness and insight of 
lawyers who had to solve clients’ problems, rather than a union of lawyers and 
judges trying to preserve businesses.  
Indeed, courts’ reaction to the application of fraudulent conveyance law was 
to link its use to a “fair” result for all, by taking lawyers’ suggestion that the 
issue was little more than one of allocation of value to all stakeholders, including 
shareholders. When value was insufficient, someone had to lose, and courts, 
especially through cases such as Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd,19 used 
equitable principles inherent in fraudulent conveyance law to distribute those 
losses. As I once wrote: 
But if reorganization extended the “value of the road” to creditors on 
“equitable terms,” could plan proponents exclude dissenting creditors? 
Equity provided no firm answer. The Court’s solution sounded in 
waiver and estoppel: “If [the creditor] declines a fair offer he is left to 
protect himself as any other creditor of a judgment debtor, and, having 
refused to come into a just reorganization, could not thereafter be heard 
in a court of equity to attack it.” In other words, upon declining a fair 
offer, the creditor was estopped from challenging the reorganization. 
Thereafter, the only recourse would be to sue to collect from the 
execution-proof former shell. 
Boyd thus stands for two closely aligned principles. First, 
continued shareholder participation in the reorganized debtor creates a 
presumption of collusion sufficient to permit successor liability. The 
Court called this presumption a “fixed principle” that operates 
regardless of the estimated value of the debtor’s property. Second, 
reorganization managers could dispel this presumption by 
promulgating a fair offer to all creditors. So long as a fair offer made 
any existing value available to all participants, courts would respect 
the reorganization and its effect on unsecured creditors. Boyd thus 
created a procedural device to avoid judicial entanglement in 
substantive evaluations of value.20 
Reorganization professionals thus took creditors’ fraudulent conveyance attack, 
and turned it against its promoters. They argued that fairness lay in the process, 
 
 19 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913). As I have noted earlier, by that time almost a majority 
of railroads had undergone some form of financial reorganization. Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and 
Absolute Priority, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 74 (1991).  
 20 Markell, Owners, supra note 19, at 81.  
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not the result. This was a legal masterstroke. Process was easier to evaluate than 
result, and more in line with the types of procedural disputes courts were 
accustomed to resolve. That fraudulent conveyance law was used for this result, 
I contend, owes more to the cleverness and craft of lawyers, and less to the vague 
principles of fraudulent conveyance law and its protean prohibition against 
transfers made with the intent to hinder, delay and defraud. Put another way, 
fraudulent transfer law was more about directions than destinations, more about 
suggestions that solutions. 
II. JUDGES AND MODERN REORGANIZATION 
With fraudulent conveyance law as the cauldron in which solutions were 
brewed, Professor Baird then traces the enhanced role of bankruptcy judges to 
the efforts of William O. Douglas and Jerome Franks, New Deal warriors with 
expanded ideas of what reorganization should be. One of their main tools was 
disclosure. As Professor Baird frames the issue:  
Douglas and Frank both believed that bankruptcy judges should be 
broadly empowered—whether by designating votes, subordinating 
claims, disallowing claims, or otherwise sanctioning the parties—to do 
what was necessary to ensure that parties bargained in good faith. The 
judge had to protect the integrity of the process. To do this, judges had 
to know what was going on. Hence, disclosure was the first obligation 
of participants in the reorganization process, but only the first.21 
Disclosure helped to ensure a fair process; after all, as the saying goes, “sunlight 
is the best disinfectant.” But Professor Baird does not emphasize that disclosure 
was sold not as a tool for the judge, but as an aid to creditor enfranchisement. 
Here I return to the Wittgenstein example that opened this short piece. Both 
Professor Baird and I agree that disclosure is critical, but different results arise 
for current problems depending on your perspective as to why disclosure is 
necessary.22 
One way in which this difference can be seen is by examining the disclosure 
justification as used with respect to elements thought necessary to a fair 
reorganization. An example is feasibility, found in § 1129(a)(11). The financial 
viability of a debtor is critical to a successful reorganization. Yet this 
information is under the parties’ control, and often there is incentive to fudge or 
 
 21 Baird, supra note 1, at 711.  
 22 There is a separate issue as to whether disclosure is effective for either purpose. As to creditor voting, 
see Brian L. Betker, et al., “Warm with Sunny Skies”: Disclosure Statement Forecasts, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 809 
(1999). 
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enhance the data in ways intended to mislead or fool the bankruptcy judge. If 
the judge were a referee in Professor Baird’s view, that referee would have 
access and insights into how the feasibility determination was made. But 
incentives exist to conceal from the judge the reasons for collusive agreement 
on feasibility. As Harvey Miller, one of the great reorganization lawyers of our 
time, put it: 
Because Chapter 11 provides no role for the court to participate in the 
formulation of a plan and only gives the court a limited ability to 
determine the feasibility of a plan, no court, including the Delaware 
Bankruptcy Court, can be faulted for ‘reorganized’ debtors’ 
recidivism. The real problem lies not in the Delaware Bankruptcy 
Court, but in the conference rooms across the country where the 
debtors and creditors create and agree to reorganization plans. In those 
conference rooms, a bankruptcy judge has no control or influence, and 
the parties themselves may bind each other to dubious reorganization 
plans. Despite the debtor’s lack of commensurate bargaining leverage, 
once the debtor and the creditors’ committee have committed to a plan, 
a bankruptcy court will usually defer to the professed expertise of the 
parties’ financial advisors, investment bankers, and other plan 
advocates, and confirm the proposed plan.23 
The point is that incentives exist for reorganization professionals not to be 
candid with the judge on all issues critical to the reorganization.24 These 
incentives can arise in many ways. They could arise from strategic 
considerations, such as suppressing issues that would scuttle a deal. As Harvey 
Miller notes, issues such as feasibility are often the subject of a bargaining 
 
 23 Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1987, 
2011 (2002). 
  24 An example in which a court found a lack candor is In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 462 B.R. 795, 804 
n.14 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2011): 
[T]he court states that it specifically finds Mr. Kvarda’s [debtor’s finance professional] and Mr. 
Myles’s [debtor’s president] testimony on the upside scenarios to be not credible. The strongest 
testimony on this point came after a long break during which counsel was able to confer with 
both witnesses, and to frame tendentious questions. With due respect to the witnesses, their 
responses appeared rehearsed. Further, neither witness withdrew or recanted any of their earlier 
testimony on the ephemeral nature of the upside scenarios, thus creating uncertainty as to their 
exact testimony. As stated above, the court credits the earlier testimony given before they were 
recalled. 
Lastly, one will exhaust one’s patience counting the disclaimers in the amended disclosure 
statement and in Mr. Kvarda’s and Mr. Myles’ declarations as to the accuracy of the information 
given. While the court understands and acknowledges that no witness is, or can be, a guarantor 
of forward-looking information or projections, the level of disassociation exhibited by these 
witnesses was beyond reasonable or what this court has seen in the past. 
For purposes of full disclosure, I was the trial judge in the Las Vegas Monorail case. 
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process that not only excludes a judge’s participation, but is intentionally 
structured to keep the issue from the court until it is too late—or, in the lingo of 
some, after the reorganization train has left the station.  
An aligned problem centers on whether judges themselves view their role as 
good faith governors. Many do not. Those who do not view their role as an active 
participant thus participate less than optimally for enforcement of the norms 
Professor Baird describes. Despite the broad powers given to bankruptcy judges 
in § 105(d) of the Code, these judges take seriously the shift in 1978 away from 
the participatory referee model prevalent under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act to a 
traditional judicial model in which judges exist to resolve disputes, not monitor 
and guide a process. As noted in the legislative history, the 1978 revisions: 
[R]emove[d] many of the supervisory functions from the judge in the 
first instance, transfer[ed] most of them to the trustee and to the United 
States trustee, and involve[d] the judge only when a dispute arises. 
Because the judge no longer will have to take an active role in 
managing bankruptcy cases, the bankruptcy court should become a 
forum that is fair in fact and in appearance as well.25 
Whether this change ever took hold can (and has been) debated,26 but the 
disparate approaches to chapter 11 case management belie any overarching role 
of the bankruptcy judge as a monitor of the bankruptcy process. As a result, 
those reorganizations which fall to more passive judges will result in the judges 
themselves lessening their participation in the non-courtroom aspects of 
reorganization.  
A final basis for a lack of candor in the process is perhaps itself an unwritten 
rule, or maybe even one that may not be spoken. Many reorganization 
professionals disdain bankruptcy judges as low-level functionaries who are not 
partners in the reorganization process, but potential roadblocks to a deal. I have 
heard professionals mumble and grumble that they cannot understand why a 
person who is paid less than their lowest associate and who went to an inferior 
law school (and may never have been a corporate restructuring lawyer) has the 
right or ability to scupper their deal.27 This view can, and probably does, lead to 
perverse strategies regarding venue and judge-shopping. It certainly is inimical 
to constructing an image of the bankruptcy judge as referee. Phrased differently, 
a bankruptcy judge’s ability to police the rules of reorganization, whether written 
 
 25 H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5966. 
 26 Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as 
Producer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431 (1995). 
 27 This usually comes from a partner whose hourly billing rate is more than 220 times the minimum wage. 
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or unwritten, correlates strongly with the respect given to that judge, and 
bankruptcy judges in general. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Baird’s article highlights an important area of reorganization 
practice—the unwritten norms and rules of a complex process. In it, however, 
he sketches a view of and role for judges that does not, for me at least, ring true. 
After describing reorganization as involving many unwritten rules for 
negotiation and result, he describes the “job of the bankruptcy judge” as one of 
“polic[ing] these negotiations and mak[ing] sure that they are done according to 
Hoyle.”28  
I am not sure Hoyle is the right metaphor. Hoyle, who wrote the rulebook 
for the game of whist, is more associated with enforcing known and written rules 
for a game, something quite different from monitoring adherence to unwritten 
rules to ensure a result.  
I think the better analogy might be to the Marquess of Queensberry rules for 
boxing. These rules, which sought to refine bare-knuckle fights into something 
for a broader audience, set twelve rules for a fisticuffs match.29 If the match met 
the new rules, it was legitimate; if not, it was not. The rules were simple, and 
were enforced on-the-go by referees. Rule 1, for example, set the boundaries of 
the playing field: “To be a fair stand-up boxing match in a 24-foot ring, or as 
near that size as practicable.”30 Rule 2 set the permissible style of engagement: 
“no wrestling . . . allowed.”31 These rules did not specify the bounds of 
practicality or attempt a definition of “wrestling.” 
But perhaps the rule more relevant to reorganizations, though, is Rule 11: 
“That no shoes or boots with spikes or sprigs [wire nails] be allowed.”32 If 
present, a referee could disqualify a boxer. Now that’s a metaphor for judges’ 
role in reorganizations.  
 
 28 Baird, supra note 1, at 717. 
 29 John Graham Chambers, The Marquess of Queensbury Rules, BRITISH BOXERS (Feb. 19, 2015), https:// 
www.britishboxers.co.uk/2015/02/the-marquess-of-queensbury-rules/ (“written by John Graham Chambers, a 
member of the British Amateur Athletic Club [and] [p]ublished in 1867 under the sponsorship of John Sholto 
Douglas, ninth marquess of Queensberry”).  
 30 Id.  
 31 Id.  
 32 Id.  
